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“…abandoning the public interest can be caused by many things, of which timidity and 
desire for personal security are the most insidious.” 
— Howard Morgan, to President Kennedy in 19631 
 
I. Understanding Policy Making in the Telecommunications Industry 
 
Morgan’s tone closely resembles that of several modern researchers who argue that 
policy makers with the influence to increase telecommunications access levels in the 
United States—primarily those in the FCC—have been negligent in their duties.  One 
reason for this negligence includes their preoccupation with maintaining their 
government positions.  But their timidity in policy formulation has deeper roots, namely a 
lack of necessary industry and technical knowledge and their generally complacent 
attitude toward enhancing public access to information networks. 
 
One such researcher arguing for a more active approach to telecommunications access 
policy making, Jorge Schement, co-director of the Institute for Information Policy at the 
Pennsylvania State University, spoke eloquently of the dangers of a complete lack of 
regulation during the academic forum held by the FCC during the drafting of its 1999 
Strategic Plan:  “with complete de-regulation, you get lord of the flies; not chaos, but the 
imposition of rules on behavior by a very small number.”  He then argued that access 
should serve as a core value for the FCC, something that is not currently the case: 
 
“Focusing on access it seems to me is the ultimate justification for any mission of an 
organization like the FCC in a democracy because short of that, it's not anchored to 
anything that we hold dear in terms of our basic values.  It's anchored basically to 
behavior and at the point that the behavior is either resolved or the players don't chose to 
play, that justification goes away.”   
 
Schement goes on to suggest that access is a local concept, and that the FCC’s federalist 
view of access is now detrimental because “we [academic researchers] increasingly know 
that local circumstances shape the opportunities for access all across the nation.”2  
Schement then argues that the goals of the FCC should not reside in competition or 
access per se, but rather in social, economic, and political participation.  To the extent 
that access policies can promote such participation, they should be supported.3  To this 
end, Schement offers several suggestions for enhancing the effectiveness of 
telecommunications access policies:   
                                                 
1 Howard Morgan, letter to the President, January 23, 1963, Washington DC.  Quoted in (Kohlmeier 1969), 
p. 82. 
2 Schement is referring to work, including his own, that has shown numerous circumstances across the 
United States where local circumstance override national access trends and assumptions.  See [Schement, 
1995 #241; Schement, 1996 #243; Schement, 1997 #245; Schement, 1998 #246; Schement, 1998 #247; 
Schement, 1998 #396; Schement, 1999 #248; Schement, 1999 #249; Schement, 1999 #250; Schement, 
1999 #251; Schement, 1999 #252; Schement, 2000 #253; Mueller, 1994 #194; Mueller, 1996 #196; 
Mueller, 1997 #197].  
3  (Commission ) p. 37-40 
 
 
 
 
1)  Recognize the role maintenance  costs play in long-term access levels, regardless of 
the service in question: 
 
“So if we're going to subsidize, we shouldn't subsidize access.  Access isn't the problem.  
We should subsidize maintenance.  Helping people stay on once they're on is much more 
likely to keep people on and raise telephone rates from where they -- penetration rates 
from where they have been than if we were focusing on access.”4 
 
2)  Increase demographic data collection and dissemination by the FCC: 
 
“The FCC ought to be looking to share with others; ought to be looking to build the kind 
of data-collecting regime that allows others to participate in collecting the data, but also 
in sharing it.5 
 
3)  Promote functional access, or helping people acquire the access they want, not just 
access that Congress or other government bodies think people should or should not have: 
 
 “Americans make choices on how to access and we ought to facilitate those choices 
because what we want to do is facilitate access.  It shouldn't matter to us how they access.  
It should matter to us that they access in functional ways and that functional is a social 
construction that they decide for themselves.”6 
 
Acting on these or any other suggestions for substantive policy change in the 
telecommunications sector is easier said than done.  William E. Kennard, Chairman of 
the FCC, commented on the difficulty of affecting change in telecommunications access 
policy in the United States: 
 
“…one of the most important lessons that I've learned is how difficult it is in this town, 
given the way policy is made in Washington today, to stay focused on your agenda and 
keep it moving, because the whole infrastructure of the town is designed to co-opt your 
agenda.  It is an unbelievable thing.”7   
 
Kennard discussed one instance—his FCC confirmation—where his ability to generate 
and regulate telecommunications policies was affected by outside interests groups: 8 
   
You know, we are daily assaulted by people who are paid a lot of money to basically take 
the agenda away from the five commissioners.  And it's the most amazing thing.  I mean, 
                                                 
4 (Commission ) p. 123 
5 (Commission ) p. 85-86 
6 (Commission ) p. 124 
7 (Commission 1999b) p. 82 
8 An interest groups is an intermediary between citizens and government.  Dozens of books and hundreds 
of articles exist on defining and elaborating interest groups and how they affect governmental decision 
making.  The definition listed above is both to narrow the term and thus increase its usefulness, at least for 
my purposes.  More lengthy definitions and discussions can be found, in, among others, (Berry 1977), 
(Mahood 2000), (Olson 1965), (Schattschneider 1961), and (Stone 1996). 
 
 
 
I've never had a job where so many people are paid so much money to talk to me and tell 
me what to do.   
 
And it's not just the, you know, the people who are paid to do their work, the lawyers and 
the lobbyists, but it's the think tanks, it's the PR campaigns.  It's the way that people are 
able to get hearings called in Congress. 
 
And you're called up there and not only are the hearings instigated often in this way, but 
the questions are planted.  The most amazing thing happened to me in my confirmation.  I 
was -- the night before my confirmation, one kind soul faxed me a stack of questions that 
were going to be asked of me in my confirmation.   
 
Many of them had been drafted by industry groups and not only -- they had the 
letterheads right there, you know, ask him this; if he says this, say this.  You know, it's an 
amazing thing.  And so we are challenged here, and I know many of you are in 
government, so you face the same challenges to find the true public in the public interest 
because what we hear most of, what is so easy for us to do is to hear what the 
shareholders' interests are, the economic interests, the industry interests.  And sometimes, 
when you're in my position, just trying to articulate what this means to the average 
consumer or people who rely on these services is sort of an aside or an afterthought, 
because the press is always -- they're here... 9   
  
Both Schement and Kennard illustrate well the complex telecommunications policy 
creation process and the difficulty in not only creating a viable new policy, but keeping 
that policy from being watered down or buried by opposing policy makers.  Especially 
difficult is promoting telecommunications policy, defined by Aufderheide as “calculated 
government intervention in the structure of businesses that offer communications and 
media services”10, that does more than support a Market-oriented viewpoint.  A brief 
discussion why it is difficult to promote a non-Market viewpoint, particularly at the FCC, 
is given below. 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, the FCC historically took two views of access regulation, 
broadcasting and the common carrier.  Both views were grounded in the organizational 
structure of the telecommunications industry in the early 1900s and were viewed by the 
FCC as successful because they promoted a smooth working of the corporations within 
these sectors of the economy.  With these views and an organizational structure built 
around distinct industry segments, the FCC has been ill-prepared to react to emerging 
new technologies and political pressures advocating change.11   
 
                                                 
9 (Commission 1999b) p. 82-83 
10 (Aufderheide 1999) page 5. She considered the intervention calculated because all policy decisions 
inherently involve risk—the risk involved in deciding between alternatives with unknown outcomes. (Dahl 
1989) page 75.  (Bernstein 1998) on p. 8 makes an interesting observation that the word “risk” is derived 
from the Italian word “risicare” which means “to dare”—viewing the policy-making process as a challenge 
among parties instead of a cooperative experience fits more with the perception of corporate decision 
making process than “objective” policy making by government bodies.   
11 (Fried 1999; Huber 1997; Hundt 1997; Powell 1998a) 
 
 
 
While the FCC remained content to operate under these two regulatory paradigms, in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, it came under increasing pressure from Congress and already 
dominant telecommunications industry lobbyists to move toward a Market-centric 
outlook, primarily because the Internet and other new technologies, notably wireless, 
cable, and broadband telecommunications access,  gave existing companies the 
opportunity to expand their reach into the consumer’s home.  Unable to combat this 
political pressure, the FCC Commissioners, already closely-associated with the 
corporations they themselves ostensibly regulated, shifted their regulatory ideology to 
more closely align themselves with their economist staffers.   
 
This ideological shift resulted in the FCC’s nearly wholesale endorsement of the Market 
as the most effective tool for “regulating” the telecommunications industry.  Policies 
challenging the legitimacy or validity of the Market’s ability to distribute licenses, 
promote access, or promote competition were viewed with much skepticism.  The main 
objective of the FCC became not the regulation of the telecommunications industry, but 
rather the promotion of competition in the telecommunications industry.   
 
The FCC saw a competitive marketplace as a means of self-regulation for the 
corporations and an efficient distributive mechanism for telecommunications goods and 
services, such as access to the telephone.  FCC reports beginning in the mid 1990s 
showcased this new emphasis on promoting the Market above all else. And perhaps 
unwittingly, the FCC, by moving towards this view, effectively reduced its legitimate 
role as a regulatory body, and lessened the need for its existence. 12    
 
In sum, the FCC has become an organization whose primary mission is to promote 
competition in telecommunications industry, with all other policies viewed as helping 
agents for the Market.  Therefore, access policies are promoted only if they support a 
more competitive marketplace.  The public interest, once seen as counteracting market 
failures, is now viewed by the FCC as synonymous with competition, and thus has been 
co-opted and relegated to irrelevancy.13   
 
Thus the FCC makes the decisions it does because it now views itself as a the promoter 
of competition instead of as an active regulator.  Or, to look at it in another way, the FCC 
sees as the best way to regulate the American telecommunications industry the promotion 
of free market policies.  As a result, it has taken the position that while the Market does 
not immediately solve all issues of inequity, it has the potential to do so in the future and 
to counteract the forces of the Marketplace prematurely could negatively affect the 
telecommunications industry more than it would aid it.    
                                                 
12 (Albiniak 1999; Chen 2000a; Chen 2000b; Commission 1997b; Commission 1999a; Crowe 2000b; FCC 
1999; Kennard 1998; Kennard 1999; Kumar 2000; Stone 2000) 
13 (Commission 1995; Commission 1996; Commission 1997a; Commission 1998; Furchtgott-Roth 1998; 
Kennard 1999; Krasnow 1998; Lathen 1999a; Lathen 1999b; Lundstedt 1977; Mueller 1997; Ness 1998; 
Permut 1998; Powell 1998b; Rowland 1997) 
 
 
 
 
As it relates to promoting telecommunications access policy in the public interest, the 
FCC is unlikely to change its current policies of promoting marketplace competition 
above all else.  With bi-partisan Congressional pressure firmly leading the FCC to 
deregulate as opposed to regulate, funding may become an issue if the FCC does not 
comply with this pro-Market directive.  Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the 
Commissioners are already beholden to some degree to the industry for post-Commission 
careers, and to not promote pro-Market policies that allow for expansion could be 
dangerous for their future job prospects.  Additionally, most FCC staffers now employed 
take a decidedly pro-Market approach, and thus internal FCC reports already support a 
pro-Market viewpoint.  There is simply no entity within the FCC’s immediate vision 
disagreeing with the pro-competitive viewpoint, especially since the Public and non-
corporate interest groups are given little input into the FCC’s decision-making process. 14 
 
What is most disturbing about the FCC and its role in telecommunications policy is the 
small likelihood that its stance will change in the near future.  As its funding and 
legitimacy is in many way determined by Congressional support and industry 
acknowledgement of its regulatory power, there is no current incentive for the FCC to 
alter its focus of promoting competition to the virtual exclusion of all other policies.  
Furthermore, since this ideology has been prevalent within the FCC for at least five years, 
to change it would be a time consuming process, and would have to be replaced with 
another, equally powerful viewpoint.   
 
Additionally, since both access and the public interest have been successfully consumed 
by the reigning “deregulate and favor the Market” viewpoint, even these two policies are 
not seen as competitors to the incumbent Market-driven one.  In a way, the true 
insidiousness of the FCC’s pro-Market focus is not the Commission’s false assumption 
that the Market can solve anything.  It is instead the assumption that all policies, 
regardless of whether they explicitly associate themselves with the Market, are indeed 
best served by the Market, and should thus be left to the Market.  In short, all policies not 
explicitly incorporating the Market into their structure are seen as being unaware that the 
Market can indeed solve the issues mentioned in the policy, and thus need to have the 
FCC explicitly associate them with the Market, such as the current issue of broadband 
access.15    
 
To change the dominant pro-Market paradigm in telecommunications regulation as 
articulated by the FCC would require three things:  1)  The introduction of FCC staff and 
Commissioners who oppose the laissez-faire view of the Marketplace in favor of a more 
realistic view that market failures occur on a regular basis and that government-led policy 
changes, such as policies promoting telecommunications access, can rectify such failures; 
                                                 
14 (Commission 1997b; Commission 1999a; Commission 1999b; Commission 2000) 
15 (Albiniak 1999; Bloomer 1999; Culver 2000; Dickson 2000; Lathen 1999a; Magazine 2000; Now 1999; 
Ozer 1999; Speta 2000) 
 
 
 
2) The removal or lessening of the political pressures by Congress, corporate lobbyists, 
and other institutions to focus solely on promoting competition to the exclusion of other 
legitimate policies, such as telecommunications access; 3)  The introduction of a new 
telecommunications access policy theory that offers a practical means for incorporating a 
carefully articulated definition of the public interest into the policy creation process.  As 
the first two deal with altering the regulatory structure and are best done in person, this 
dissertation will instead strive to obtain the third item. 
 
Before the new telecommunications policy access theory is described, however, it makes 
sense to first describe the telecommunications industry in more detail and to build on 
Chapter 3’s discussion of how the FCC has neglected promoting access and the public 
interest in favor of the Marketplace and how such actions are detrimental to consumers 
and the Public at large. 
 
Two examples in particular highlight how current telecommunications policies, 
especially those promoted by the FCC, have not only failed to secure a more competitive 
marketplace, but have hindered telecommunications access in the public interest in the 
meantime.  These examples, the local and long distance telephony market and the 
changing characteristics of the average telecommunications user, are discussed below.  
Following this discussion, a theory promoting telecommunications access in the public 
will be introduced that shows how such actions can be avoided in the future. 
 
A. Local and Long Distance Telephony 
The term telephony, once meaning only voice communications, is increasingly blurred.  
“Telephone” companies now routinely send great volumes of data across their once 
“voice-only” networks; the four remaining RBOCs (also known as ILECs)16 saw at least 
a 25% gain in their data revenue in 1999, compared to 1998, and expect even larger gains 
in 2000.17  See Tables 4.1-4.3 for specific 1999 revenue and percentage amounts. 
 
Table 4.1 Total Revenue of Bell Companies 199918 
 
Company Revenue (in billions) 
SBC   $49.5 
Bell Atlantic  $33.2 
BellSouth  $25.2 
US West  $13.2 
 
                                                 
16 Regional Bell Operating Companies—the local telephone companies of the Bell System prior to the 
breakup of AT&T in 1984.  Bell Atlantic and BellSouth are two examples.  RBOCs are also referred to as 
ILECs, or incumbent local exchange carriers.  The competitor carriers are termed CLECs, or competitive 
local exchange carriers. 
17 (Cantwell 2000) 
18 Source for Tables 4.1-4.3 is (Cantwell 2000). 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Data as Percentage of Total Bell Company Revenue 1999 
 
Company Percentage 
US West 12.9% 
SBC 11.5% 
BellSouth 11.1% 
Bell Atlantic 8.7% 
 
Table 4.3 Wireless as Percentage of Total Bell Company Revenue 1999 
 
Company Percentage 
SBC 13.7% 
Bell Atlantic 13.7% 
BellSouth 12.7% 
US West 1.8% 
 
Also changing, although much more slowly, is the degree of competition in local and 
long distance markets.  Despite the FCC’s rhetoric, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
has not promoted significant competition, and competition has not drastically affected 
either the local or long distance markets.  For instance, RBOCs still dominate as 
providers of virtually all the major metropolitan areas in the United States,  serve close to 
75% of the population19, and according to the FCC’s 2000 report on competition in the 
telecommunications industry bill 96% of 1998 local service revenues.20 
The vast majority of new growth and most of the new competition in the 
telecommunications industry has come in the form of competitive local exchange carriers 
(CLECs) that compete with the Bell companies for customers in local markets.   The total 
number of US facilities-based local competitors has doubled since 1998’s 160 to 333 by 
the end of 1999.  Total access lines have increased almost as much:  from 5.5 million in 
1998 to 10.4 in 1999 and as access lines have increased, so too has revenue from 
competitive local switched services:  $3,500 million in 1998 to $6,300 million in 1999.21  
The RBOCs have not welcomed these new competitors; they have in many cases have 
thwarted the upstarts’ attempt to gain and retain customers:  The RBOCs hamper even 
simple installations of telecommunications services, purposefully process inaccurate 
CLEC, and delay billing and provisioning schedules.22  Keep in mind that these tactics 
come years after the passage of the 1996 Act forbidding such practices and have for the 
most part gone unpunished by the FCC.  In fact, the FCC has even supported incumbent 
RBOCs in their desire to enter other markets, despite the fact that they continue to hinder 
competitors in their own local markets:  the FCC approved Bell Atlantic’s entry into the 
                                                 
19 (Commission 1995) p. 46 
20 (Commission 2000) p. 47 
21 (Wilson 2000) 
22 (Geppert 1999) 
 
 
 
New York long distance market despite the Department of Justice’s recommendation to 
reject the application or at least approve with more stringent conditions.23 
With Bell Atlantic’s entry, and other RBOCs as well—US West recently won approval to 
provide long distance service in Texas—the long distance sector is beginning to see 
competition.  Much like the local market, however, entrenched players still dominate the 
long distance market and dictate the access prices and services available to consumers.   
For instance, average retail prices for interstate long-distance services in the US have 
dropped only 5% since the 1996 Act was passed.24   
 
An analysis of the market structure of the industry using a standard economic metric, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), further illustrates the relatively little progress made 
by “Market-focused” policies of the FCC.  The HHI is a summary measure of the market 
structure of an industry; it is a measure of industry concentration and by extension 
monopoly power.  The HHI has been a staple of industrial organization economics for 
thirty years and is held in high regard by policy makers, regulators, and other legislators 
since it takes into account a market’s absolute numbers of  firms, their relative sizes, and 
gives greater weight to dominant firms with high market share.25   
 
The HHI is calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of each company in the 
industry.  Pure competition, with an infinite number of competing firms, would result in 
an HHI of 0, while a market dominated exclusively by one company—a monopoly—
would be 10,000, since one firm would have 100% of the market share:  (100) 2 = 10,000.  
As an example, Table 4.4 lists the long distance telephony market’s HHI as 8,155 in 
1984:  (90.1)2 + (4.5) 2 + (2.7) 2 + (2.6) 2 = 8,155. 
 
According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission, a market with an HHI value under 1,000 is 
considered unconcentrated and mergers within such an industry that leaves the HHI under 
1,000 is not seen as adverse to competition.  A market with an HHI value between 1,000 
and 1,800 is considered moderately concentrated and merger increases that raise the HHI 
more than 100 points "raise significant competitive concerns,” according to the 
guidelines.  Markets with an HHI over 1,800 are considered highly concentrated and any 
                                                 
23 (Crowe 2000a).  Section 271 of the 1996 Act requires that four criteria be met before a long-distance 
application by an RBOC will be granted.  First, the RBOC must show that one local competitor is using its 
network and providing local service via an interconnection agreement or if no local competitor is using the 
network, the RBOC must provide a statement by the state commission showing the RBOC’s willingness to 
offer the use of its network.  Second, nondiscriminatory access must be established with the a detailed 14 
point checklist that includes specific access and service level requirements.  Thirdly, the RBOC must not 
aid its long distance affiliates in gaining unfair advantages such as using existing customer information to 
promote new broadband services.  Finally, the applicant must demonstrate that its entry into the LD market 
would promote the public interest.   
24 (Poor's 1999) 
25 See (Hirschmann 1964) for an early explanation of the index.  See (Greer 1992) for a more recent 
discussion with more current journal references, Chapter 7. 
 
 
 
mergers that raise the HHI by more than 50 points in such an industry raises antitrust 
concerns.26  In short, markets with HHI’s under 1,000 are considered competitive, those 
between 1,000 and 1,800 are moderately competitive, and those over 1,800 likely to be 
dominated by a monopoly or oligopoly 
 
AT&T was a virtual monopoly at the time of its breakup in 1984, as shown in Table 4.4.  
While competition in the long distance market has improved since then, recent market 
consolidation efforts threaten to reverse the trend of the last 15 years; the recent MCI—
WorldCom increased the HHI for the first time since the breakup of AT&T in 1984 and 
did so in an already highly concentrated industry.  In fact, according to the DOJ’s own 
guidelines, the merger should not have taken place, yet the FCC approved it.  And AT&T 
still has a dominant position in many parts of the country:  when measured at the state 
level, AT&T’s market share is never less than 40% and rises to 75% in some states.27  
                                                 
26http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hhi.htm 
http://barney.sbe.csuhayward.edu/~skamath/powerpoint/econ3551s7/sld001.htm 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/fedgaz/00-01/HHI.html  
 
The following is the relevant excerpt the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, found at: http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/toc.html: 
 
1.51 General Standards 
 
In evaluating horizontal mergers, the Agency will consider both the post-merger market concentration and 
the increase in concentration resulting from the merger.(18) Market concentration is a useful indicator of 
the likely potential competitive effect of a merger. The general standards for horizontal mergers are as 
follows: 
 
a) Post-Merger HHI Below 1000. The Agency regards markets in this region to be unconcentrated. Mergers 
resulting in unconcentrated markets are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and ordinarily require 
no further analysis. 
 
b) Post-Merger HHI Between 1000 and 1800. The Agency regards markets in this region to be moderately 
concentrated. Mergers producing an increase in the HHI of less than 100 points in moderately concentrated 
markets post-merger are unlikely to have adverse competitive consequences and ordinarily require no 
further analysis. Mergers producing an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points in moderately 
concentrated markets post-merger potentially raise significant competitive concerns depending on the 
factors set forth in Sections 2-5 of the Guidelines. 
c) Post-Merger HHI Above 1800. The Agency regards markets in this region to be highly concentrated. 
Mergers producing an increase in the HHI of less than 50 points, even in highly concentrated markets post-
merger, are unlikely to have adverse competitive consequences and ordinarily require no further analysis. 
Mergers producing an increase in the HHI of more than 50 points in highly concentrated markets post-
merger potentially raise significant competitive concerns, depending on the factors set forth in Sections 2-5 
of the Guidelines. Where the post-merger HHI exceeds 1800, it will be presumed that mergers producing 
an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points are likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its 
exercise. The presumption may be overcome by a showing that factors set forth in Sections 2-5 of the 
Guidelines make it unlikely that the merger will create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise, in 
light of market concentration and market shares. 
27 (Commission 2000) p. 84 
 
 
 
Combine this trend with the rapid consolidation of the local telephone market as shown in 
Figure 4.628 and it becomes apparent that more competition has not been a result of the 
1996 Act or the FCC regulation of the telecommunications industry29, and that serious 
access issues—particularly those in the public interest—still remain.30     
Table 4.4 Market Share of US Long Distance Carriers 1984-199831 
 
 
                                                 
28 Figure 4.3 does not include all of AT&T's activities since its inception as the parent company of the Bell 
System in 1899.   Instead, it emphasizes changes in AT&T's corporate structure following its 1984 
divestiture.  Therefore, more emphasis is placed on the Regional Bell Operating Companies than such 
notable components of AT&T as Western Electric and Bell Labs. 
29 The HHI, while still the dominant indicator of monopoly power, is not foolproof.  The first drawback is 
that it is often difficult to define what market is under consideration, especially in the telecommunications 
industry.  Secondly, in industries where a limited number of players actively engage in vigorous price wars, 
abuse of monopoly/duopoly power is often questionable, such as in the soft-drink industry where Coca-
Cola and PepsiCo control 75% of the market and arguably in the long-distance market when referring to 
calling plan packages.  Newer econometric methods that focus instead on price increases as a result of 
mergers are now used in conjunction with the HHI (Staff 1998). 
30 Since 1998, there has been further consolidation in the local market.  Only four of the original RBOCs 
now exist, and only Bell South has not merged with either a previous RBOC or a long-distance carrier.  
Furthermore, the remaining local companies are still virtual monopolies in their respective areas.  To be 
fair, there has also been an increase in local competitors and the RBOCs are slowly moving into the long 
distance market.  Yet as these companies vie for customers, and as cable and wireless networks merge with 
traditional local and long distance networks, the large players will account for relatively more revenue than 
they do today, thereby further increasing their market power. 
31 Table 4.4 and 4.5 shows total market share based on revenue (Commission 2000). 
 
 
 
Table 4.5 Residential Market Share of US Long Distance Carriers 1995-1998 
 
 
 
  
 
 Figure 4.6 Evolution of AT&T 1899-2000 
 
 
B.  Internet Services 
Whereas the FCC has investigated at a high level Internet service and its associated issues 
of open access, broadband access, and the Digital Divide, it has not formulated specific 
policies to address Internet access at an individual or household level.  Instead, it has 
allowed the Market to dictate penetration rates and levels.  For many households, this has 
worked well.  Yet access policies in the public interest address more than just the 
wealthiest or the earliest adopters.  They address those who for whatever reason are 
unable to acquire and retain access to such services without assistance, whether that 
assistance be private or government-based.   
 
Since private corporations in the United States tend only to sell products and services and 
ignore the broader social implications of their actions, it often falls on the government to 
address these social implications.  Yet as has been said earlier in this chapter and in 
Chapter 3, the FCC now believes that the Market should address these implications.  The 
practical implications of such a viewpoint are that the corporations become tantamount to 
the Market and anything they do is seen as legitimate and effective market forces.  And, 
as just said, the corporations are more concerned with the profit-oriented consequences of 
their actions and less so with the less tangible effects upon the Public.   This is 
unfortunate because as seen below Internet access is becoming a dominant form of Public 
interaction and participation and must be addressed by specific telecommunications 
access policies. 
 
While the number of users and their and annual expenditures on telephony products has 
remained relatively stable, as shown in Table 4.7, the number of Internet users has grown 
drastically (Table 4.8), as has their diversity.  While household income is still positively 
correlated with Internet use,32  the fastest growing segment of new Internet users are 
those with annual household incomes between $25,000 and $49,00 per year.  In fact, by 
2003, households earning under $35,000 will comprise one third of the estimated 162 
million home users in the US, and they are expected to fuel Internet usage beyond its 
current household penetration level of 50%.33   
 
Table 4.7 Annual Household Telephony Expenditures 1995-199834 
 
                                                 
32 (Census 1999) Table 922 
33 (Trager 2000) 
34 (Commission 2000) p. 26  Table is in current dollars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.8 US Adult Internet Users 1997-199935 
 
Period Number of Users (in millions) 
Mid 1997 52.6 
Mid 1998 65.1 
Year End 1998 83.6 
Mid 1999 100.7 
Year End 1999 106.3 
 
The degree to which the Internet and its related services have affected 
telecommunications users has also increased drastically.  A 2000 survey by Wired 
magazine divided its respondents into three categories:  very wired, somewhat wired, and 
not wired.  Those who were very wired used four or more of the following technologies:  
Internet, cellular or wireless phone, computer, fax, email, online banking or investing, 
and online shopping.  Of note is that the original 1997 survey which inspired this 2000 
survey used as its criteria for “very wired” only laptop, cell phone, beeper, and home 
computer, plus a requirement for email use three times a week.  In the 1997 survey, only 
9% of the respondents, even by that diminished criteria, were very wired or somewhat 
wired.  Today, that percentage, with the more rigorous definition, stands at 31% for very 
wired and 46% for somewhat wired, for a total of 77%—an eightfold increase.  When 
asked in the 2000 survey which forms of technology they used most, the 100 year-old 
technology still prevailed:  the telephone (albeit wireless or cellular) with 45%.  A close 
second was the computer (43%), followed by email (37%) and the Internet (31%).  When 
asked “In 10 years, will Internet access become as common as the telephone in US 
households?”, 88% said “Yes.”36  Also according to Wired, both “average” and “high-
volume” households use email frequently, along with numerous other communication 
technologies which may be Internet-centric.  As shown in Table 4.9,  the average 
household sends/receives 16.4 electronic communications per day while the high-volume 
user sends/receives 34.3 communications per day with pagers and emails accounting for 
the greatest difference between the two groups.  
 
Table 4.9 Weekly Communications Sent and Received 200037 
 
Technology Average Household High-Volume 
Household 
Phone 54 102 
Mail 35 50 
Email 16 59 
Voicemail 4 12 
                                                 
35 (Infoworld 2000) 
36 (Breslau 2000) 
37 (Staff 2000) 
 
 
 
Cell phone 3 8 
Pager 2 7 
Fax 1 2 
Total 115 240 
 
The longer Internet users maintain access, the greater amount of time they spend on the 
Internet, as shown in Table 4.10.  Furthermore, Internet users also purchase more—
significantly more—the longer they are online, as shown in Table 4.11.  What is also of 
note is that the effect of online tenure is constant regardless of the goods and services 
purchased.  Whether it is a computer system, a CD, or groceries, the longer someone has 
been online, the more likely they are to purchase an item.   
 
What this data indicates is that once exposed, online access is viewed by its users as a 
critical and if not necessary component of their lives.  This characteristic of the Internet is 
reminiscent of the telephone—once people have access to it, they tend not to relinquish it 
unless under extreme hardship.  Together, these tables describing online access show that 
telecommunications access is expanding and growing; people are not simply moving 
from the telephone to the Internet; they are maintaining their use of traditional 
technologies such as the telephone, and increasing their use of the online technologies. 
 
Table 4.10 Hours Per Week Spent Online By Online Tenure 199938 
 
Group   Hours 
Newbies 5.4 
Intermediates   6.5 
Veterans 8.2 
 
Table 4.11 Online Sales Between Thanksgiving and New Year's Day 199939 
 
Category Research Convenience Replenish 
% bought by Veterans 74% 66% 77% 
% bought by 
Intermediates 
23% 28% 23% 
% bought by Newbies 3% 7% 0% 
 
 
                                                 
38 Newbies are those who have been online under 1 year.  Intermediates have been online 1-2 years, and 
veterans have been online over 2 years (Jupiter 1999). 
39 Researched goods consist of items that a consumer would do background research on before making a 
purchase; they tend to be expensive items such as computer systems and furniture. Convenience Goods 
include what marketers have traditionally labeled impulse buys, or those that people buy because they saw 
or heard about the item.  They include books, CDs, and other smaller-ticket items. Replenishment Goods 
are goods oriented toward basic human necessities, such as groceries and drugs (Inc. 1999). 
 
 
 
II. Comparing Four Contemporary Network Access Theories 
 
“Theory” is a vague word.  In communications research, it has several connotations, 
distinguished by McQuail (1994) into four types:  social scientific, normative, 
operational, and everyday.40  Social scientific theories focus on observation and 
hypothesis testing, and may incorporate prediction of agent behavior.  Normative theories 
focus on social values and help show how media should operate or behave and why.  
Operational theories are practical in nature; they show how practical “industry 
knowledge” is applied by its practitioners.  Everyday theory is concerned primarily with 
describing the individual knowledge people have based on their own experiences.   
 
The Network Access Theory (NAT) as introduced in Chapter 1 is a broad normative 
theory taking a macro approach that advocates a change in the way policy is created in 
the United States, particularly as it relates to telecommunications access in the public 
interest. Being normative, the theory proposes a view of how policy should be created, 
who the interested parties should be, what objectives should be strived for, and what the 
outcomes should be in a successful telecommunications access policy.  Succinctly, the 
goal of the NAT is to explicitly include the public interest in the telecommunications 
access policy creation process.  The purpose of this inclusion is to increase the Public’s 
social, economic, and political participation via the creation and implementation of 
proactive and progressive policies at the national and local levels.   
 
While the NAT is normative, it does have some social scientific qualities, specifically in 
its use of quantitative data and reliance upon a comparative analysis of competing 
theories based upon pre-established criteria.  These non-normative qualities help to give 
it credence and move beyond its marking as a “wish list” theory—the NAT can be 
effectively implemented in the “real world.”  
 
A.  Competing Access Theories 
Three telecommunications access policies based on other access theories will be used for 
comparison purposes to highlight the strengths of NAT-based policies relative to their 
competitors. The assumption behind this policy analysis is that theories provide the 
general worldview and main assumptions upon which policies are built.  These policies 
are the practical manifestations of the theories, and can be more closely and accurately 
evaluated than the more general theories, especially a normative theory.  Furthermore, 
policies usually have more direct impact on the environment in which they are 
introduced. 
 
For clarity, a NAT-based policy is hereafter referred to as a Network Access Policy 
(NAP).  To clarify, the NAT is the foundation upon which a NAP is created.  A NAP is 
therefore the product of the NAT.  As such, the measure of success for the NAT is a 
policy—a NAP—that incorporates all of the NAT’s required qualities and successfully 
                                                 
40 (McQuail 1994) p. 4-6 
 
 
 
achieves the theory’s objectives, namely the promotion (and tangible increase) in Public 
access to the Nation’s telecommunications network.  In short, a successful policy is an 
indicator of a successful theory, so a successful NAP indicates that the NAT is a 
successful theory.  The presence of this equivalency is why the a NAP will be compared 
with the policies of other theories to demonstrate the NAT’s superiority as a means for 
restructuring the telecommunications access policy creation process. 
 
The criteria used to judge the policies is based on the core values and structure of the 
NAT.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the NAP excels in each one of these areas and overall is 
“rated” higher than its three competing policies.  The intent of the comparison was not to 
set up a “straw man” argument whereby the three competing policies were weak from the 
start and the NAP was overpowering.  This would have resulted in an illogical 
argument—the NAT is the better theory because the NAP derived from it more 
thoroughly represents the characteristics of the NAT.  This would also have been a waste 
of time since the theory as stated is already normative, in that it takes as one of its core 
assumptions that it intends to promote specific values that other theories neglect.  In that 
sense, there is no need for such an illogical justification for the NAT’s legitimacy. 
 
Instead, the analysis is to demonstrate that the value of the NAT resides in several of its 
unique characteristics.  The NAT has the ability to structure a telecommunications policy 
creation capable of generating polices which accurately reflect the Public’s interests 
regarding network access.  Additionally, no other access policies have such capabilities.  
This is not a surprising argument; if a policy existed and had been implemented that 
could already meet the objectives of the NAT, then the promotion of telecommunications 
access in the public interest would have already been achieved. 
 
So, the analysis of the different policies should be regarded as an illustration of the 
different perspectives, assumptions, and objectives of the parent theories.  For instance, 
the analysis will demonstrate how the NAT places more emphasis than the other theories 
on several issues, particularly:  1) Diverse yet concerted policy maker participation, 2)  
Practical implementation of viable technologies to facilitate access, and 3)  Promotion of 
telecommunications access that promotes social, political, and economic participation. 
 
The three competing theories are:  Free Market Theory, FCC Access Theory, and ICM 
Universal Service Theory.  Since the alternative theories are not the primary focus of this 
dissertation, they will not be reviewed in as much detail as the NAT has been.  What 
follows is a brief summary of the alternative theories followed by an evaluation of the 
policies each theory generates.   
 
The Free Market Theory (MKT) is defined by its reliance upon capitalistic market forces 
as articulated by orthodox economists—supply, demand, profit motives, individual 
freedom, and corporate accumulation of wealth—to self-correct inefficiencies within the 
telecommunications sector of the economy. As such, government policies are not needed 
 
 
 
to correct these inefficiencies; they will only hinder what the market is already capable of 
doing.41  Examples of efficiencies that the Market is supposed to be able to correct 
include: unequal access to goods and services despite a consumer’s ability to pay, prices 
for goods higher than people are willing or able to pay, and unfair competition within a 
marketplace. 
 
FCC Access Theory (FCC) is based upon the assumption that all people in the United 
States should have reasonable access to the nation’s telecommunications network at an 
affordable price.  While this definition is moving toward including Internet-based 
services and products, it is still rooted in historical universal service policies that rely 
upon the telephone as the technology of choice as well as a common carrier view of 
regulation. Recently FCC Access theory has begun to borrow assumptions and objectives 
found in the Free Market Theory. 
 
ICM Universal Service Theory (ICM) builds upon the FCC Access Theory to explicitly 
include advanced telecommunications services such as the Internet as well as several 
elements lacking in the FCC policy including individual choice, a recognition of local 
versus national circumstances, and the belief that access policies should be proactive, not 
reactive.  
 
The ICM was underpinned by four interconnected principles:  availability, connectivity, 
affordability, and choice.42  The four elements were inseparable; without any piece of the 
triangle, the entire structure falls.  This tight integration is what gave the ICM of 
universal service its potency:  any mandate meeting the ICM’s stringent requirements 
presumably had overcome the difficulties at each stage of development; its “bugs” have 
been worked out. 
 
Finally, there is a realization in the ICM that the Market cannot self-correct all market 
inequities and that corporate assistance could be of use to government regulators in their 
pursuit of increased Public telecommunications access.  This realization is perhaps the 
most distinct difference between the ICM, FMT, and FCC theories and is the closest link 
to the NAT. 
                                                 
41 Chapter 3 discusses this viewpoint in more detail, especially when it references FCC reverence to the 
Market. 
42 See the following references for a formulation of a version of an Internet-based universal service 
program, the Informed Choice Model (ICM).  The pyramid structure was taken from this body of work as 
well (Schement 1995; Schement 1998; Schement 1999; Schement 2000). 
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